More than two decades ago, while still a graduate student, I asked the late Tamura Yoshirō 田村芳朗 (1921–1989), the recognized authority on the subject, if any other Japanese scholars were devoting attention to medieval Tendai original enlightenment thought in connection with Nichiren’s teaching. Prof. Tamura named only one, a scholar considerably younger than himself, whom he respectfully termed his “worthy opponent”: Hanano Jūdō. Since the 1970s, Hanano has published a great number of essays on original enlightenment thought, several offering thought-provoking challenges to Tamura’s more broadly circulated arguments. The present volume, an expanded version of Hanano’s 2009 doctoral dissertation (Waseda University 早稲田大学), draws together twenty of his articles, including a couple of early essays but most written from 2000 on. Collectively, they represent the fruit of Hanano’s lifetime study of medieval Japanese Tendai and Nichiren doctrine.

In recent years, due in part to the movement known as “critical Buddhism” (hiban bukkyō 批判佛教), the subject of “original enlightenment thought” (bongaku sbisō) has gained considerable attention, but it remains poorly understood, and the term is often bandied about in a loose and superficial way. Hanano employs the rubric in a precise manner to denote the doctrinal mainstream of medieval Japanese Tendai, which viewed awakening, not as the fruit of a long process of striving, but as innate from the outset. His volume combines painstaking textual analysis with a broad contextualizing of bongaku thought in Buddhist intellectual history, significantly advancing the study of this important topic. It will be welcomed by specialists in the Tendai and Nichiren traditions and deserves the attention of anyone seriously interested in Japanese Buddhist thought.

The volume consists of four parts. Part I, “The Formation and Development of the Unproduced Threefold Body,” traces the genealogy of the “unproduced threefold body” (musa sanjin 無作三身), a distinctive concept of the Buddha set forth in medieval Tendai texts. Part II, “The Formation and Development of the Fourfold Rise and Fall,” establishes the dating of the kyōban 教判 or doctrinal classification system known as sbijū kōhai 四重興廃, by which medieval Tendai thinkers sought to systematize the whole of Buddhism from an original enlightenment perspective.'

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1. The four divisions in this system are the pre-Lotus Sūtra teachings (nisen 無前), which are said to be partial and incomplete, denying the possibility of Buddhahood to some categories of persons, in contrast to the perfect teaching of Lotus Sūtra, which is all-encompassing and promises universal Buddhahood; the “trace teaching” (shakumon 追門), or first fourteen chapters of the Lotus, which addresses this absolute soteriological equality in terms of abstract principle (ri 理); the “origin teaching” (bonmon 本門), or second fourteen chapters of the Lotus, which represents that equality in terms of all concrete phenomena (事) as the expressions of original enlightenment; and meditative insight (kanjin 観心), the subjective grasp of the perfect teaching in faith and practice.
Part III, “Japanese Tendai Thought and Nichiren Doctrinal Studies,” represents Hanano’s critique of received scholarly theories on the vexed issue of the relation of Nichiren’s thought to that of Tendai bongaku doctrine. And Part IV, “A Proposal for a Historical Perspective on Buddhist Thought,” attempts to situate Tendai original enlightenment doctrine within the larger context of Buddhist thought, especially in relation to the Kamakura “new Buddhist” teachers, Shinran 観賢 (1173–1262), Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253), and Nichiren 日蓮 (1222–1282). Hanano provides a modern Japanese gloss for the entirety of two seminal medieval Tendai works: Jigyō nenbutsu mondō 自行念仏問答 (Questions and Answers on the Nenbutsu as Self-Practice) and Sanjū shika no kotogaki 三十四箇事書 (Notes on Thirty-Four Articles, on which more below), resolving a number of textual problems in the process. There are also a substantial “Afterword,” indices, and detailed abstracts of the volume in Chinese and English. Rather than address each chapter individually, I will try to summarize and comment on the volume’s major themes.

Hanano first develops a detailed genealogy of original enlightenment thought organized from the perspective of “buddha body theory” (busshinkan 仏身觀), displaying throughout an extraordinary command of both Chinese sūtra exegesis and a vast range of Tiantai/Tendai literature. He begins with the Chinese Tiantai patriarch Zhiyi 智顕 (538–597) and his rejection of the notion, famously set forth in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (Dasheng qixing lun 大乘起信論), that an originally pure mind, coming into contact with the defilements, gives rise to the phenomenal world. For Zhiyi, mind is not prior to phenomena; both are always mutually inherent. On this basis he asserted his unique claim that the primordially awakened Śākyamuni Buddha of the Lotus Sūtra embodies all three bodies—the Dharma body (Skt. dharma-kāya, Jpn. bosshin 法身), the reward body (sambhogakāya, bōjin 報身), and the manifested or response body (nirmāṇakāya, ōjin 應身). These three Zhiyi held to be inseparable, mutually interpenetrating, and “constantly abiding,” without hierarchy or sequence among them. While the eternal nature of the Dharma body—the Buddha as ultimate principle—was commonly accepted, Zhiyi’s claim that all three bodies “constantly abide” conflicted with commonsense understandings that the reward body, being acquired through practice, has a beginning, and that the response body, the Buddha’s physical person, is subject to birth and death. Zhiyi’s successors Zhanran 湛然 (711–782) and Saichō 観霊 (766/767–822) sought to strengthen his position by assimilating to Tiantai doctrine the Huayan teaching that suchness (equated with the Dharma body) is not only an unchanging principle (fūben shinrō 不變真如) but has also the dynamic aspect of manifesting as phenomena in accordance with conditions (zuien shinrō 隨緣真如). In this way, they could assert that the reward and response bodies, equated with the dynamic aspect of suchness, are, like the Dharma body, timeless and all-pervading. Saichō termed this the “unproduced threefold body” (musa sanjīn). Tendai enthusiasts will especially appreciate Hanano’s astute analysis of the single enigmatic passage in Saichō’s work in which this phrase occurs (pp. 113–18). Saichō’s emphasis on the expression of suchness as concrete phenomena laid the foundation for his later disciples—Ennin 圓仁 (794–864), Enchin 圓珍 (814–891), and Annen 安然 (841–?)—to develop a distinctively Tendai form of esotericism (Taimitsu 台密) that equated
the primordially awakened Śākyamuni of the *Lotus Sūtra* with the cosmic Buddha Mahāvairocana (Dainichi Nyorai 大日如來), whose thoughts, speech, and body are all phenomena. Medieval Tendai scholars inherited this tradition; they also appropriated the term “unproduced threefold body” in a sense quite different from Saichō’s to mean an originally inherent Buddha prior to the distinction between delusion and awakening, the true aspect of deluded ordinary worldlings “just as they are” (*ari no mama* ありのまま).

While Hanano’s treatment of buddha-body theory offers a new perspective on the genesis of original enlightenment ideas, the most revisionist parts of his volume are the chapters dealing with medieval Japanese *hongaku* thought and its relation to Nichiren. This is a long disputed issue, mediated by two complex, interrelated problems. First is the dating of those medieval Tendai texts that set forth original enlightenment ideas. Many of these works were not signed by their authors but retrospectively attributed to great teachers of the past, such as Saichō, Genshin 源信 (942–1017), or Chūjin 忠尋 (1065–1138). A number of them probably had no unitary author but represent collections of *kirikami* 切紙—single sheets of paper recording secret oral teachings (*kuden* 口傳) transmitted from master to disciple as lineage property. Thus, dating any individual text presents formidable difficulties, let alone establishing an entire chronology for the development of *hongaku* thought. Nichiren’s dates are known, and his writings, several of which refer to *hongaku*-related terms and concepts, would seem to provide a firm temporal reference point. However, several scholars in the Nichiren tradition have questioned Nichiren’s authorship and regard these as spurious works produced by his later disciples under medieval Tendai influence. Thus the question of dating Tendai *hongaku* ideas has become inextricably intertwined with that of textual authenticity in the Nichiren corpus.

Tamura Yoshirō was the first to propose a detailed chronology for Tendai *hongaku* literature. Drawing on the work of the Nichiren sectarian scholars Asai Yōrin 浅井要麟 (1883–1942) and Shigiyō Kaishū 執行海秀 (1907–1968), Tamura dated the flowering of original enlightenment thought to the mid–to late–Kamakura period. While Tamura himself stressed its tentative nature, due to his stature in the field, his chronology has been widely reproduced and appears in standard reference works such as *Tendai hongaku ron* 天台本覚論 in the *Nibon shisō taikei* 日本思想大系 series. Other scholars have disputed his dating of specific texts, but Hanano is the only one to challenge the whole chronology, pushing the establishment of original enlightenment thought back to the Insei period (1086–1192), specifically, around the twelfth century.

Central to both scholars’ arguments is the dating of the *Sanjū sbika no kotogaki* (hereafter *Kotogaki*), traditionally attributed to Kōkaku 皇覺 (c. 1096–1176), known as the founder of the Sugiu branch 相生流 of the Eshin lineage 惠心流 of Tendai. Tamura viewed the *Kotogaki* as a watershed work containing all the elements of

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mature original enlightenment thought; later developments, he said, are merely matters of systematization. Hanano concurs with this assessment. Although the Kotogaki takes the form of collected kirikami, its intellectual content is internally consistent, and Hanano sees it as representing a single authorial voice. To fix its dating, then, would establish a key piece in the jigsaw puzzle (Hanano’s analogy) of dating medieval Tendai texts. Several scholars focusing on Pure Land thought, including Satō Tetsuei 佐藤哲英 (1902–1984) and Inoue Mitsusada 井上光貞 (1917–1983), have deemed that the Kotogaki is indeed Kōkaku’s work, placing its composition in the Insei period, while Tamura and other scholars focusing on the Nichiren tradition have pushed it forward to around the time of Jōmyō 靜明 (n.d.), a later figure in the Sugiu line, active in the mid-Kamakura period. Depending upon one’s view of the matter, Hanano says, the formative moment of medieval Tendai original enlightenment thought shifts by about fifty to a hundred years.

Up until now, the Kotogaki has been known chiefly from a transcription held by Kanazawa Bunko and from a later, printed version attributed to Genshin known as Makura sōbi 枕雙紙. Hanano has compared the Kanazawa manuscript against five other extant transcriptions and determined that, of these six, a 1408 transcription held by Saikyōji 西教寺 is the earliest, retaining the form closest to that of the original. He also provides, as an Appendix, a printed version of the kanbun text along with glosses of terms and a modern Japanese rendering of the Saikyōji manuscript—a massive scholarly achievement. By a detailed comparison of colophons, accompanying lineages charts, and other, internal evidence, Hanano develops a theory for how later variants of this work emerged from the original and argues persuasively for an Insei dating. Key to his argument is a critique of the unproduced threefold body concept that appears in the Gengi shiki 玄義私記 (c. 1182), a commentary on Zhiyi’s Fabua xuanyi 法華玄義 by the Tendai scholar-monk Hōjō-bō Shōshin 寳地房證真 (c. 1129–1214). The Kotogaki is the first known medieval Tendai work to discuss this doctrine in detail. While we cannot know whether or not Shōshin was responding to the Kotogaki itself, his criticisms clearly reflect awareness of the musa sanjin idea that the Kotogaki represents—strong evidence that the Kotogaki may precede or be contemporary with Shōshin. Hanano shows conclusively that the Kotogaki cannot be as late as Jōmyō, as the four versions of the work late enough to mention Jōmyō in the accompanying lineage charts already reflect a process of divergent development. In the absence of a firm, contemporaneous external reference, Hanano’s conclusion that Kōkaku is himself the work’s probable author cannot be established conclusively, but he offers plausible counterarguments to all who have dated the Kotogaki to a later time. A major strength of Hanano’s treatment is that, in developing his own position, he cites and responds to every scholar who has ever weighed in on a particular question, thus providing the reader with the history of argument for each point that he addresses.

The second linchpin in Hanano’s chronology is his argument for the authenticity of the *Rissōkan jō* 立正観抄 (On Establishing Correct Contemplation) attributed to Nichiren. This work criticizes a Tendai doctrinal innovation known as “contemplative insight surpasses the *Lotus*” (*shikan sbō hokke* 正観勝法華), which argues the existence of an ineffable *dharma*, known only through meditative insight, that is independent of and prior to the *Lotus Sūtra* text. Since this claim represents an extension of the medieval Tendai classificatory system of the fourfold rise and fall, it belongs to a rather late stage in the systematization of medieval Tendai doctrine. If the *Rissōkan jō* is in fact Nichiren’s work, that would mean that this systematization had already taken shape by the latter part of the thirteenth century, when Nichiren was active. However, Asai Yōrin, Tamura, and others have regarded the *Rissōkan jō* as a retrospective attribution, written by Nichiren’s later followers to counter a Tendai position that did not appear until after his death.

The *Rissōkan jō* has been known through a 1325 transcription made by Nisshin  日進 (1271–1347), third abbot of Minobu-san Kuonji 身延山久遠寺, head temple of the Nichiren sect, and several scholars have suggested that Nisshin is in fact its author. However, Hanano notes the existence of a second, 1364 transcription, made by Nitcho  日朝 (n.d.) of the Fuji lineage (Fuji monryū 富士門流, today’s Nichiren Shōshū 日蓮正宗) and held by its head temple, Taïseki-ji 大石寺. A split between the Minobu and Fuji lineages, the first schism among Nichiren’s disciples, occurred in 1288 or 1289, just a few years after Nichiren’s death. The schism was a bitter one, and it would most likely have been impossible, Hanano argues, for a priest of one lineage to copy texts held by the other after that point. If so, this is strong presumptive evidence for the authenticity of the *Rissōkan jō*, and thus, for Hanano’s proposed chronology of medieval Tendai thought.

Hanano does not go nearly as far as he could in drawing out the implications of his chronology, as it potentially alters the broad picture of Japanese religion during the Insei period. By Tamura’s account, the religious anxieties of the latter Heian, fueled by social upheaval, belief in the onset of the degenerate *Final Dharma age* (*mappō* 末法), and an ethos of “loathing this defiled world and aspiring to the Pure Land” (*onri edo gongū jōdo* 厭離穢土欣求淨土), gave way after the establishment of the Kamakura Bakufu to a brighter, more hopeful outlook in which “world affirming”

4. I myself was initially persuaded by the argument for Nisshin’s authorship but altered my opinion after Hanano pointed out the existence of Nitcho’s manuscript in a 2006 review of my *Original Enlightenment*. I stand by my larger point, however, that Nichiren’s followers in the second and third generation were particularly eager to counter the “*shikan surpasses the Lotus*” doctrine, which “eastern Tendai” scholars, especially of the Senba 仙波 line—a major competitor in the Kantō provinces—had adopted as a signature doctrine. This argument does not depend upon whether or not the *Rissōkan jō* is Nichiren’s work. I do not claim, as Hanano seems to think I do (pp. 657–58), that the *shikan sbō hokke* concept was created by Kantō Tendai scholars to counter Nichiren doctrine; it may well have originated on Mt. Hiei. Nonetheless, as Ono Bunkō 小野文雄 has suggested, the argument that contemplative insight is independent even of the *Lotus Sūtra* could be deployed to undermine the Nichiren Hokkeshū’s text-based position of *Lotus* exclusivism and may have proved attractive to Kantō Tendai scholars for that reason (Stone, *Original Enlightenment*, 308–14).
bōngaku thought flourished. Hanano’s chronology, however, would suggest that world-rejecting Pure Land discourse of the Insei period coexisted within the same time frame—and probably within the same institutions—as the emergence of bōngaku ideas. The complex picture of competing religious ideologies that Hanano’s dating implies seems more convincing, at least to me, than does Tamura’s linear narrative.

Hanano is explicit about what his chronology means for our understanding of Nichiren. Several influential Nichiren sectarian scholars have sought to divorce Nichiren’s thought from the Tendai bōngaku discourse of his day, tending to regard the latter as a corrupt doctrine of uncritical world affirmation. Asai Yōrin, for example, saw Nichiren as intellectually indebted not to his Tendai contemporaries but solely to the “orthodox” Tiantai/Tendai tradition represented by Zhīyì, Zhanran, and Saichō.1 In contrast, Hanano argues—rightly, in my view—that, although Nichiren selectively cites Zhīyì and Zhanran’s works as proof texts, the fundamental structure of his thought is much closer to that of medieval Japanese Tendai than to that of his Chinese forebears. Against the classical Tiantai position that Buddhahood is achieved gradually over multiple lifetimes (the position of “acquired enlightenment” or shikaku 始覚), Nichiren, like his Tendai contemporaries, held that Buddhahood is realized at the stage of “verbal identity” (myōji-soku 名字即), the initial stage of faith and practice (the position of “original enlightenment”). Hanano demonstrates more concrete ties as well, showing Nichiren to have been conversant with secret transmissions of the medieval Tendai Eshin and Danna 檀那 lineage. Nichiren’s distinctive equating of the five characters myōhō renge kyō 妙法蓮華經 that compose the Lotus Sūtra’s title with the “three thousand realms in a single-thought moment” (ichinen sanzen 一念三千), Hanano suggests, may derive from such transmissions. Even the fundamental practice that Nichiren advocated, chanting the title or daimoku 項目的 the Lotus Sūtra, had clear precedents in medieval Tendai. Hanano’s historicized treatment of Nichiren’s thought is usefully read in conjunction with the recent work of Lucia Dolce. Against the claims of Asai Yōrin and others that Nichiren had firmly rejected esoteric Buddhism, Dolce has shown Nichiren’s critique of esoteric Buddhism to be a legitimizing strategy, and that in fact, he appropriated basic structures and assumptions of medieval esoteric thought and practice.6 Hanano and Dolce together show us a historically grounded Nichiren whose creativity lay neither in his isolated religious genius nor in his restoration of a “pure” Tiantai/Tendai tradition but in welding the intellectual currents of the age to his particular religious vision.

In contextualizing Nichiren in this way, Hanano engages the thorny topic of textual authenticity in the Nichiren canon. Nichiren’s voluminous writings may be roughly grouped into three categories: 1) those that survive in Nichiren’s handwriting or as transcriptions made by his immediate disciples, and whose authenticity

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5. Asai Yōrin 浅井要麟, Nichiren Shōbōn kōgaku no kenkyū 日蓮聖人学の研究 (Kyōto: Heirakuji Shoten 平楽寺書店, 1945); see esp. chap. 6, pp. 182–373 passim.

is therefore established; 2) those writings transmitted as Nichiren’s but for which no holograph or early notice survives, and whose authenticity is therefore undetermined or in some cases disputed; and 3) a small number of obvious apocrypha and misattributions. (Sueki Fumihiko 末木文美士 has conveniently termed these Nichiren A, Nichiren B, and Nichiren C.) Many of Nichiren’s works dealing explicitly with original enlightenment ideas fall into the “B” category. According to sectarian scholars such as Asai Yōrin and Shigyō Kaishū—along with Tamura, who drew on their work—these writings contain ideas inconsistent with Nichiren’s “primary thought” and are most probably pseudographia produced by later disciples. In contrast, Hanano argues repeatedly that the determination that any particular work is apocryphal must rest on solid textual or bibliographical evidence and not on the work’s thought content; judgments that a particular writing “sounds strange” or that Nichiren “could not possibly have said that” are too readily shaped by the reader’s subjective impressions. Those who cast suspicion on particular writings as not authentically Nichiren’s, he says, should be prepared to suggest who else might have written them and why.

On the one hand, Hanano deserves applause for demanding greater rigor in designating as “suspicious” texts traditionally attributed to Nichiren. Asai Yōrin pioneered the use of modern text criticism in the study of the Nichiren canon, but his critical approach was enlisted in the flawed project of recovering a “pure” Nichiren doctrine, uncontaminated by what Asai saw as the degenerate influences of esoterism and original enlightenment thought. Tamura, who specialized more broadly in Lotus Sūtra-based traditions and the Kamakura new Buddhist movements, avoided Asai’s problematic assumption of an originally “pure” Nichiren but followed his lead in questioning Nichiren’s authorship of writings attributed to him that reflect original enlightenment ideas. This position rests less on hard textual evidence than on an interest in demonstrating Nichiren’s independence from the medieval Tendai of his day, and its argument is circular: Original enlightenment is pre-defined as extraneous to Nichiren’s “primary thought,” and any reference to it in a writing attributed to him is then cited as evidence for questioning that work’s authenticity. The real challenge to this reading is the occurrence of bongaku-related elements in several of Nichiren’s unimpeachably authentic writings. Tamura attempted by tortuous argument to distinguish between the use of bongaku ideas in Nichiren-attributed works that do not survive in holograph—which according to him strongly “stress original enlightenment thought” and are therefore suspect—and in authenticated works, some in Nichiren’s autograph, which “take nondual original enlightenment thought as their basis but nonetheless emerge from it.” Hanano is quite right to criticize such assessments as vague and subjective. Labeling of particular works as dubious has also led to a paralyzing hermeneutics of suspicion and a tendency to base studies of Nichiren solely upon his fully authenticable writings.

Hanano counters that relying only on unimpeachable documents is not the hermeneutically “safe” position that it appears to be. Whether or not a particular work has survived in Nichiren’s hand may easily be a matter of historical accident—as poignantly illustrated by the loss of twenty-five of his holographic writings in a fire at Minobu–san Kuonji in 1875.

On the other hand, Hanano’s insistence that labeling particular works as suspect must rest on concrete textual evidence raises the question of how in general he would treat the great number of writings in the “Nichiren B” category, those revered by the tradition as Nichiren’s work but that do not survive in holograph or early transcriptions. Does he mean to say that, absent any evidence to the contrary, all these are to be unproblematically regarded as Nichiren’s work—a presumption of “innocent until proven guilty,” so to speak? If so, I would have to disagree. While lack of a holograph or early transcription does not in itself constitute a suspicious circumstance, it invests these works with an ambiguity that removes them from the unimpeachable category of “Nichiren A.” “Nichiren B” works in a majority of cases have a high probability of being authentic, and they certainly should be considered in studying Nichiren’s thought. But in so doing, one must acknowledge that they belong to an ambiguous realm in which we cannot, at least not at our present level of scholarship, always meaningfully distinguish between the historical Nichiren and his interpretive community—a point that Sueki has also argued.⁹

Hanano also seeks to place Tendai bongaku thought within a larger context, both in terms of Buddhist intellectual history and in relation to the Kamakura new Buddhist movements, building upon the work of the pioneering scholar Shimaji Daitō 島地大等 (1875–1927), who first established “original enlightenment thought” as a scholarly category. Since this aspect of his study relates to the broad contours of Japanese Buddhism, it may be expected to elicit debate. I have some reservation about Hanano’s proposal for viewing the history of Buddhist thought as an “increasing development in the direction of original enlightenment” as it spread eastward from India to China and Japan. Not all elements of Japanese Buddhism fit readily into a bongaku framework (mainstream Pure Land discourse of the latter Heian comes to mind), and a view of Buddhist intellectual history focused solely on this aspect risks obscuring other, disparate strands. Hanano’s tracing of the antecedents of bongaku thought is strong as a genealogy; it weakens when expanded into a perspective on Buddhist intellectual history more generally.

A more complex set of question concerns the terms on which Hanano—and others—compares original enlightenment ideas with the thought of the Kamakura new Buddhist teachers. Ever since Shimaji famously characterized medieval Tendai bongaku thought as the “womb” or “matrix” from which the Kamakura new Buddhism emerged, scholars have debated how the two are related. Some have tried to deny the influence of original enlightenment thought on Shinran, Dōgen, and Nichiren; others have even seen these figures as actively repudiating it.¹⁰ Despite the differences

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¹⁰. This entire debate strikes me as too neatly organized around a relatively modern schema of founders and schools. Elsewhere I have proposed an “interactive” model of Kamakura
in their chronologies, on this issue Hanano basically aligns himself with Tamura, who saw the teachings of Shinran, Dōgen, and Nichiren as synthesizing sophisticated Tendai *hongan* nondual philosophy, which absolutizes the phenomenal world as the realm of truth, with recognition of the relative distinction between delusion and enlightenment that must be bridged by practice and liberation. (Hanano’s chronology, which posits that original enlightenment thought matured before the teachers of the “new Buddhism” were active, supports this model more effectively than does Tamura’s). But the “synthesis” model assumes that Tendai *hongan* thought itself did not presuppose the necessity of practice and liberation. Several scholars to date have made precisely that claim, arguing that original enlightenment doctrine, in affirming the Buddhahood of deluded ordinary worldlings just as they are, in effect denies the necessity of practice; what need can there be for liberation if one is enlightened inherently? Hanano to his credit does not uncritically endorse this extreme reading, but at moments he seems to lean in that direction, for example, when he characterizes the *hongan* thought of medieval Tendai as “theoretical” and “remaining at the level of the abstract,” in contrast to Nichiren, who “elevated it to the domain of religion” (pp. 290, 453). To be sure, a number of medieval Tendai texts—although not all—do indeed give the impression Hanano describes of a largely theoretical affirmation of the nonduality of the Buddha and living beings. But might not this “abstract” quality—in contrast to the more concrete emphasis on faith and practice found in the writings of the Kamakura new Buddhist teachers—represent at least to some extent a difference of genre and intended readership? As Hanano notes, many *kuden* texts dealing with *hongan* ideas are closely related to the doctrinal debate practices of Tendai scholar-monks, which might well account for their seemingly one-sided emphasis on nonduality as a theoretical principle. Shinran, Dōgen, and Nichiren, in contrast, were building new religious communities and needed to guide the faith and practice of their followers. We know quite a lot about the personal religious struggles of these new Buddhist teachers but relatively little about the practices of those Tendai monks who compiled the *hongan* literature. I do not dispute that real differences of perspective existed between the two groups, but comparisons that do not acknowledge their basis in very disparate kinds of writings, along with teleological assumptions about the superior religious engagement of the Kamakura new Buddhism, strike me as problems inherent to the “synthesis” model. That said, Hanano’s discussions of Shinran and of Nichiren

Buddhism that stresses the porous nature of the institutional and intellectual boundaries between the new movements and the Buddhist mainstream, illustrating this point with interactions between medieval Nichiren and Tendai communities after Nichiren’s death. Hanano criticizes this model on the grounds that I show only Nichiren appropriations from medieval Tendai doctrine and give no examples of counter-influence (p. 657). But doctrinal borrowings are only one kind of interaction. I do document a shared medieval religious culture in which monks of the Nichiren Hokkeshū studied in Tendai seminaries; Tendai scholar-monks converted to the Nichiren Hokkeshū; and the two groups held doctrinal categories in common. Nonetheless, I take Hanano’s criticism seriously as indicating that my model needs to be further refined (see Stone, *Original Enlightenment*, 228–36, 300–55 passim).
in particular are rich and nuanced and further our understanding of their thought in its broader historical context.

An “Afterword” is often the place for a personal note. Hanano’s Afterword, more than a hundred pages, documents his harrowing struggle as a priest of Nichiren Shōshū caught between his personal commitment to evidenced-based academic scholarship and the demands of institutional orthodoxy. Many professional scholars of Buddhism in Japan are also temple priests, but Hanano’s experience has been far from ordinary. Nichiren Shōshū’s leadership took a sharp reactionary turn following the 1991 break with Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, and Hanano’s commitment to the academic study of Nichiren’s thought—and his calls for open discussion within the priesthood of doctrinal and policy issues—drew increasing hostility. Over a period of years he was repeatedly reprimanded for such “offenses against the Dharma” as associating with scholars of “heretical” sects and failing to employ the honorific “Daishōnin” 大聖人 after Nichiren’s name in his academic writing; forced to submit written apologies for “disrupting the order” of the sect by his suggestions for internal reform; effectively demoted by transfer to a remote temple posting; and ordered to submit his scholarly work to sectarian officials for approval prior to publication. Matters came to a head with the publication of his dissertation (the present volume), and Hanano left the priesthood in 2009. Wiser leadership could have used his expertise to the sect’s advantage. But Nichiren Shōshū’s loss may be scholarship’s gain. Since his departure from the priesthood, Hanano has inaugurated the intersectarian special interest journal Hokke butsukyō kenkyū 法華仏 教研究, a significant resource for the study of Nichiren Buddhism and other Lotus Sūtra–based traditions.11 He also envisions an ambitious research agenda, adumbrated in the Introduction to the present volume in a section on “topics for future study.” One looks forward to more of the textually meticulous and thought-provoking scholarship that this study represents.

Jacqueline STONE

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